Le Programme canadien pour l'embauche des jeunes était une forme ciblée de subvention à l'emploi : il permettait aux entreprises d'obtenir une réduction de leurs cotisations à l'assurance emploi si les gains assurables de leurs employés de 18 à 24 ans connaissaient une augmentation nette. Dans cet article, nous analysons les effets de ce programme. En appliquant la méthode de la différence des différences à deux ensembles de données, nous concluons que le Programme a eu des impacts importants et statistiquement significatifs. La plupart de nos observations suggèrent qu'une période supplémentaire d'emploi de 2 à 2,4 semaines a résulté en une réduction globale du nombre de sans-emploi, avec tout au plus un modeste changement dans le taux de chô mage. Plusieurs effets estimés sont plus importants chez les hommes que chez les femmes. Nous observons en particulier qu'il n'y a eu aucun effet de déplacement (c'est-à-dire le remplacement, par des jeunes, de travailleurs légèrement plus ãgés ne donnant pas droit à la subvention). Toutefois, il y a peut-être eu une diminution de la fréquentation de l'école à temps plein dans le groupe ciblé.
Introduction
In the wake of recessions, governments are interested in stimulating employment with general programs as well as with those targeting particular locations, sectors, or demographic groups. Although targeted programs have existed for many years, empirical evidence determining their effectiveness for the relevant group and quantifying unintended consequences such as displacing nontargeted groups from employment is only starting to accumulate. Youth Hires, the Canadian program studied here that subsidized youth employment through an employer-side Employment Insurance (EI; called unemployment insurance, or UI, before 1996) premium rebate, is an example of a targeted initiative. In 1999 and 2000, the Youth Hires program rebated any increase in aggregate EI premiums paid by firms for workers aged 18-24 years that were in excess of the 1998 premiums paid for that age group. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we attempt to determine whether there are any impacts on the targeted 18-to 24-year-olds and any displacement effects on older age groups for which the targeted group may act as substitute labour.
Canada continues to use these strategies. One similar program began in 2011 when the federal government introduced a suitably titled Hiring Credit for Small Business that aimed to encourage job creation using an employer-side payroll tax reduction for net new employment insured under EI. It was extended in 2012 and then extended again with expanded eligibility in 2013. However, the credit was modest at $1,000 maximum. 1 Although most economists believe that the relative inelasticity of the labour supply curve implies that changes in payroll taxes are passed on to workers through adjustments in wage rates in the long run, with minimal ensuing employment effects, there may be scope for a short-term program to affect employment levels during a period of slack labour demand. 2 Various articles reviewed in the Relevant Evidence from Other Countries section, especially Neumark (2013) , discuss the economics of these schemes at length, so we do not do so here. However, the central ideas are these: First, during periods when unemployment is high, employer-(demand-) side interventions are more likely than supply-side ones to induce employment growth; second, wage growth is relatively slow during periods of slack labour demand, so new programs' short-run causal impacts may accordingly be extended (and larger in magnitude); and, third, from an all-of-government perspective, the opportunity cost of hiring credits during recessions may be low if as a result the newly employed reduce their use of EI, social assistance, retraining assistance, and similar benefits. Of course, ''turning off'' countercyclical policies can be difficult and allowing such programs to (less or non-effectively) extend into periods with stronger labour markets may be expensive and have little impact.
Overall, our findings suggest discernible impacts of Youth Hires in that it increases employment for the targeted 18-24 age group. Furthermore, we do not find much evidence of displacement of workers in slightly older age groups. Perhaps oddly, much of the effect comes not from reducing aggregate unemployment but from a reduction in the likelihood of being out of the labour force.
The next section of this article describes the international evidence for targeted subsidy programs, and the Institutional Background Regarding Employment Insurance and Youth Hires Program section provides the institutional background for the Canadian Youth Hires. The Data and Descriptive Statistics section describes the two independent data sets analyzed, defines two comparison groups that have different strengths and weaknesses, and presents descriptive statistics and an initial graphical analysis. The Econometric Approach section outlines the econometric methodology. In particular, we address issues related to inference, which is notoriously difficult in this context where there are few degrees of freedom. (See Imbens and Wooldridge [2009] , esp. sect. 6.5.3; and MacKinnon and Webb, forthcoming.) The Regression Analysis section presents the empirical results. Similar findings from both data sets add to our confidence in the analysis. The final section summarizes and interprets the findings.
Relevant Evidence from Other Countries
Internationally, temporary hiring credits for employers are a common tool when recessionary unemployment is thought to result primarily from deficient labour demand. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2010) provides a non-exhaustive international list of such initiatives associated with the recession of [2008] [2009] , and this class of policies has been subject to academic (e.g., Neumark 2013; Neumark and Grijalva 2013; Cahuc, Carcillo, and Le Barbanchon 2014) , policy (e.g., Bartik and Bishop 2009) , and popular (e.g., Blinder 2013) attention. Testifying before the US Senate Committee on the Budget, Elmendorf (Congressional Budget Office 2011) argued that programs, such as Canada's Youth Hires, that subsidize employers as a function of payroll growth have the greatest effects on employment per dollar expended among a range of policies they considered. Employer hiring credits frequently take the form of tax, or social insurance premium, rebates. A recent review of youth-focused programs can be found in Bö rdos, Csillag, and Scharle (2015) .
Looking first at the US context, the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010 is one such effort. It exempted employers from paying their share of Social Security taxes for new hires who had been unemployed or underemployed (United States 2010). Because in 2012 employers paid 6.2 percent of each employee's annual earnings below US$110,100, this amounted to a substantial subsidy. Employers were also eligible for a US$1,000 retention credit for each of those new workers retained for at least one year. Beyond national strategies, Neumark and Grijalva (2013) and Chirinko and Wilson (2013) study various US state-level hiring credits and discuss the implications of alternative program designs. Another US federal employment subsidy, the Empowerment Zone program studied by Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) , is targeted on the basis of geographic ''place.'' Despite fears that this program would distort economic markets as a result of geographic displacement by firms and workers in response to the subsidy, they find positive benefits with only modest distortions.
Turning next to European comparisons, France initiated a temporary program in 2008 that provided social contribution rebates to small firms hiring low-wage workers. Cahuc et al. (2014) observe that the surprise introduction of the credit quite quickly resulted in effects. More important, many economists fear that versions of these programs that subsidize all (i.e., gross) new hires, as opposed to net new hires, incentivize distortionary churning as firms let existing workers go in favour of new subsidized workers. However, in France this is not observed, perhaps because of the high level of existing churn. Furthermore, despite the substantial windfall gain to employers, Cahuc et al. (2014) find that the net cost of the program is about zero once social payment reductions are considered. Focusing on youth unemployment, Sweden's reforms of 2007 and 2009 introduced large payroll tax cuts for youths. Both Skedinger (2014) and Egebark and Kaunitz (2014) find this to have been a very expensive form of employment creation in large part because it subsidized all employment and not net new employment. A related initiative is the 1997 reduction in Spanish payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanent contract employees examined by Hernanz, Jimeno, and Kugler (2003) . The authors exploit differences in tax reductions for different age groups. Comparing those aged 20-29 years with those aged 30-39 years, they find significant increases in the probability of being employed among the young treated population.
Some argue that the types of studies under discussion should consider general equilibrium effects. Crepon et al. (2012) study a set of randomized experiments in France that aimed to reduce unemployment among educated youths and show that there are significant displacement effects that are generally more significant for male than female youths. Khan and Lehrer (2013) find evidence of displacement effects in a randomized experiment aimed at increasing the size of individuals' social networks. Similarly, Dahlberg and Forslund (2005) observe displacement from wage subsidies and training, exploiting variation across municipalities in Sweden. In contrast, Blundell et al. (2004) find that displacement effects for the UK's New Deal are either quite small or counterbalanced by other general equilibrium effects. Understanding the magnitude of any displacement effects is fundamental to the evaluation of labour market interventions, although program design and context appear to matter in ways not yet fully understood.
Targeting is also important. O'Leary, Decker, and Wandner (2005) argue that it is required for cost effectiveness. However, this can be problematic if targeting leads to stigmatization, as is the case for many US programs that use vouchers distributed to particular disadvantaged workers. In contrast, the Canadian approach did not require vouchers, nor did it target individuals, other than by age, so there was no stigmatization. In fact, subsidized employees need not even have been (and indeed were probably not in most cases) aware of the program because it operated entirely on the employer side.
Institutional Background Regarding Employment Insurance and Youth Hires Program
Legally, the incidence of Canadian EI premiums is partitioned across employers and employees, with employers paying 1.4 times the employee rate. Although the system responds to regional unemployment rates, it operates nationally; premiums are set annually by the federal government and are not experience rated for either the employer or the employee. 3 Youth Hires was announced in the federal budget on 24 February 1998 and was described as being a temporary measure in 1999 and 2000 to address high youth unemployment rates. 4 Because the premium rebate affected employers in all regions equally, we estimate the impact nationally.
An important limitation to our analysis is the very substantial reform associated with the move from the UI to EI system, which was phased in during the six months ending 1 January 1997. This limits our ''before'' period to two years for difference-in-differences analyses, and it also limits any ''falsification'' exercises in the preprogram period. One particularly relevant element of the reform for youths is that before the reform UI did not cover part-time jobs, whereas EI premiums are paid from the first hour of work. 5 Friesen (2002) finds a modest shift away from part-time and toward full-time employment after the move to EI and the associated introduction of EI premiums for part-time employment. 6 Also, although it was implemented late in the relevant part of the business cycle, Youth Hires was a postrecession program. Impacts from different phases of the business cycle likely differ.
Unlike the French and American programs, the Canadian one subsidized net (not gross) new insured employment. For workers who were aged 18-24 years at any point during each calendar year, any premiums paid by firms in 1999 and 2000 in excess of the 1998 premiums were refunded to the employer. Worker premiums were unaffected. Employer premium rates in 1998, 1999, and 2000 were, respectively, 3.78 percent, 3.57 percent, and 3.36 percent of insurable earnings with the maximum insurable earnings fixed at $39,000 in nominal terms. The declining premium rate implies that a firm's aggregate EI insurable payroll for those in the relevant age group had to, for example, increase by 0.21 percentage points in 1999 before the firm was entitled to the first dollar of rebate. Although the intention of the program was to increase youth employment (and reduce unemployment), employers had several margins on which they could adjust to increase premiums paid above the benchmark. They could increase any combination of wages, the number of young workers employed, or hours per year for existing young employees. However, firms received no credit for annual earnings paid to any worker in excess of the maximum insurable. 7 More important, a program that targets a particular identifiable group, in this case youths, may induce substitution toward the subsidized workers (i.e., displacement of close substitutes), and the program's aggregate impact may be less than that experienced by the targeted group. We look for evidence of such effects.
Success for Youth Hires rested in part on both its salience and transaction costs. If employers are unaware of such a program, then it only operates by easing the budget constraint on expanding firms, not through the behavioural change required to target youths; this also affects the timing of any effect. Clearly, the government was interested in behavioural change because the goal of the program was to target unemployment among a specific age group. Awareness was therefore promoted by mailings to human resource departments in firms paying EI premiums. In addition, Youth Hires had the advantage of following on the heels of the New Hires Program, which operated in 1997 and 1998. 8 New Hires' refund required an application that many small businesses found administratively costly (Canada Employment Insurance Commission, 2000) . By contrast, the Youth Hires premium rebate was presented as being automatic and without administrative burden, thereby increasing firms' benefits by reducing transaction costs. Supporting the possibility of a behavioural response by employers, much research documents how workers and firms tailor their behaviour to the parameters of the UI-EI system (see, e.g., Green and Riddell 1997; Green and Sargent 1998; Kuhn and Sweetman 1998; Kuhn and Riddell 2010) . Also promoting its success was that the program was sizable. It refunded more than $400 million in premiums to approximately 295,000 firms (Canada Employment Insurance Commission 1998 -2001 .
Given the nature of the Youth Hires program, we would not necessarily expect its introduction and termination to have equal and opposing impacts. If firms react to the incentive and hire new young workers, they must incur at least some training and other fixed hiring costs and, therefore, may continue to employ these workers after the rebate period expires. Of course, job mobility rates are quite high for young workers. Therefore, although any impact may continue beyond the program's horizon, it will attenuate over time. In this vein, one group that will need special attention are those who are age 24 years in the first year of the program but too old to be subsidized in its second year. We address this group in the empirical specification.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We analyze individuals residing in Canadian provinces using the master files of Statistics Canada's Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) and Labour Force Survey (LFS). The SLID is a rotating panel that contains roughly 60,000 individuals in each of two overlapping panels starting every three years and lasting for six years. Each individual's annual labour market outcomes are detailed. In contrast, the LFS interviews roughly 54,000 households consisting of about 100,000 individuals and capturing labour market information on the week that contains the 15th of each month. For both data sets, survey weights are used throughout, and we use all available observations from a reference year. See the Appendix for details.
The bulk of the analysis focuses on 1997-2000, that is, the two years before and the two years of the program's existence. As mentioned, the UI to EI reforms make it difficult to use data before 1997, and hiring and training costs suggest the effects of the program are likely to continue beyond its termination. Two comparison groups with different strengths are used. A comparison group close in age will likely compete in the same labour market, which makes it a good or similar comparison group but also makes it susceptible to displacement. A slightly older group is less likely to compete in the same labour markets, and thus is less liable to be displaced, but it is also probably somewhat less similar to the treated group. We use both comparison groups at different points in the analysis. The data for analysis are restricted to those aged 18-30 years, with the initial comparison group aged 25-30 years. Then a comparison group of individuals aged 28-30 years is used, with those aged 25-27 years regarded as (perhaps negatively) treated. The possibility of including individuals younger than age 18 years was not pursued given the very large share in high school.
Any significant impact of Youth Hires could affect variables such as the likelihood of being employed, wages, and hours or weeks worked. Although government policy may be motivated by unemployed youths who are out of school, postsecondary or high school attendance may also be affected, so we also investigate that outcome. This is similar to analysis of educational decisions in response to changes in the minimum wage (e.g., Landon 1997; Neumark and Wascher 2004; Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson 2003) . Table 1 contains mean values and sample sizes for the dependent variables used in the regression analysis, reflecting the variety of outcomes that might be expected to be affected by Youth Hires. These are presented by age group for the two years before and the two years of the Youth Hires program. In the top half of the table, the first three variables are from the SLID and are counts of annual weeks of employment, unemployment, and not in the labour force status. These variables are mutually exclusive and sum to the number of weeks in the year. Next are three annual indicator (0/1) variables that are not mutually exclusive. The first is equal to one if the individual was employed at any point in the year and zero otherwise. The second variable of this set measures the fraction of individuals who were not employed in the year although they sought employment (or were unemployed) at some point in the year. Similarly, the not-in-the-labour-force indicator is set to one if the person is out of the labour market at any point in the year. Total annual hours worked at all jobs in the year is next, followed by the natural logarithm of total annual income and the hours-weighted average hourly wage across all jobs. Both of the earnings measures are deflated to 1999 dollars. The new job variable indicates whether an individual started with a new employer in the reference year, and the full-time indicator is set to one if an individual's primary job was full time. If the person was a full-time student at some point in the year the student variable is set to one.
Summary Statistics
In the second half of Table 1 , the same statistics are presented for variables from the LFS. All variables in the LFS refer to the reference week. The LFS binary variables for employed, unemployed, and not in the labour force are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Total weekly hours worked is for all jobs in the reference week, and the hourly wage is for the main job. Weekly income is the product of those two. Both income and wages are converted to 1999 dollars before taking the natural log. ''New job'' is defined only for those who are currently working and is set to one if an individual started a new job in the reference week. Finally, ''student'' is a variable that indicates whether the individual was a full-time student in the reference week.
Graphical Analysis
Plots for three different variables are provided to illustrate the time trend in relevant dependent variables in the years of, and surrounding, the Youth Hires program. For various age groups in the SLID, Figure 1a shows the trends in annual total weeks employed. In the first year of the program, 1999, there are opposite effects for those In Figures 1b and 1c , we present the weeks employed trends separately by gender. The increase in the weeks employed in 1999 for the 22-24-year age group is much larger for women (Figure 1b ) than for men (Figure 1c ). The same is true for those aged 18-21 years, but to a lesser extent. Conversely, although there is no decline for women aged 25-27 years, there is a large decline between 1998 and 1999 for men aged 25-27 years, suggesting some displacement is potentially occurring for men of that age group. Weeks not in the labour force, also from the SLID, are presented in Figure 2 , and a conceptually similar pattern is evident. Of particular note, especially in the first year of the program, is the increase in weeks not in the labour force for those aged 25-27 years coincident with a decrease in the weeks out of the labour force for those aged 22-24 years. Recalling that employers were eligible for the credits if they hired those aged 18-24 years in 1999 or 2000, it appears plausible that workers in the younger age group were brought into the labour force in 1999, whereas those just excluded from (too old for) the program were slightly displaced. Although there may be some ongoing effect, no additional effect is apparent for the second year of the program. 9 Figure 3 uses LFS data to plot the employment rate over time for the various age groups; a comparatively large increase in the employment rate is seen for those aged 18-21 years in the first year of the program. The other age groups also see increases-though not as largein their employment rates, which is to be expected because general economic conditions were improving.
Although we do not want to draw too many conclusions at this stage of the analysis, these graphs support the idea that employers were preferentially hiring those subsidized by the program. Moreover, the magnitude of the aggregate affect is modest in all three graphs. Clearly, a large number of employers are increasing the size of their workforce as a result of macroeconomic trends, and this rebate is a windfall gain for them.
Econometric Approach
We use a framework that, in terms of the equations estimated, is similar to a linear difference-in-differences specification. However, the results do not have the usual interpretation as the causal impact of the treatment on the treated. Both theory and the graphical analysis suggest that the common trend assumption required to identify such a parameter is not satisfied (see, e.g., DiNardo and Lee 2011) given that the program potentially has both direct causal impacts on the targeted age groups and indirect causal impacts on slightly older workers. That is, it seems plausible that the 25-30 age group, which is too old for Youth Hires, is displaced by the program. In this situation, the difference-indifferences coefficient can be interpreted as the change in the gap between the treatment and comparison groups across the policy periods, and not as the impact of the policy change on the treatment group with the comparison group unaffected.
Beyond identification, inference using a difference-indifferences specification with a policy change at the aggregate level can be problematic, as demonstrated by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) . The policy we are investigating occurred at the national level, but it may have had differential impacts for individuals born in different years. For this reason, we cluster our standard errors by birth year, which results in 16 clusters. However, the cluster-robust variance estimator yields unreliable inference when the number of clusters is small. In the presence of few clusters, Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) argue that the wild cluster bootstrap-t technique works well, and we use this approach. 10 Because there are relatively few examples in the literature comparing these methods in application, we initially explore alternative approaches to inference, such as different distributional assumptions for t-statistics, and observe some variation. However, for most of the analysis we present only results from our preferred method of inference, which is to generate bootstrap p-values using the wild cluster bootstrap-t technique with the null hypothesis that the coefficient of interest equals zero imposed. 11 The first specification we estimate uses data from 1997 to 2000 and regards those aged 18-24 years as the treated group and those aged 25-30 years as the comparison group, as specified:
where Y it represents a labour market variable of interest; YH is the Youth Hires indicator, which is set to one if individual i is of an age targeted by the program in a year, t, in which the program is operating; and Only1999 is an indicator set equal to one for individuals who qualify for the subsidy in the first year of the program, but not the second. Age, YearBorn, and Year are all vectors consisting of full sets of indicator variables that represent, respectively, the individual's age (measured in years as of year t) and birth year and the calendar year in question. This represents an effort to flexibly control for any background effects that may influence the coefficient of interest. The vector of variables identified as Controls is in parentheses to indicate it is included in some, but not all, specifications. For both data sets, the control variables are an indicator for gender, indicators for province of residence, an indicator for urban residence, an indicator for married, and an indicator for high school graduation. The SLID regressions additionally include indicators for various ethnicities and an indicator for immigrant status. The monthly nature of LFS allows for the inclusion of a full set of months indicators. The betas are vectors of coefficients to be estimated.
In all cases, the equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. Some specifications are linear probability models. Standard errors are clustered on the individual's birth year because we view the program as having differing impacts across cohorts. This approach allows e it to be arbitrarily correlated within clusters but assumes zero correlation across birth cohorts. In some specifications using the SLID data, an individual fixed effect is included, recognizing that individuals are in the sample for as long as four years.
The coefficient b YH is the difference-in-differences variable of interest and, as mentioned, its estimate will conflate any positive impact on those in the treatment group with any negative impact on those in the comparison group in the years when the program is operating. We are agnostic as to the expected sign of b 99 because it will hinge on the impact of the program in 1999 and the degree of labour market attachment in the subsequent year. We do not report the coefficients for b 99 in the text, though in general the coefficients are of the same sign, smaller in magnitude, and of lesser statistical significance than the coefficients for b YH .
A second specification is estimated using the 28-30 age group as the comparison group. Plausibly, this comparison group is less (or is minimally) affected by the Youth Hires program, so treatment effects can be estimated separately for the targeted and potentially displaced groups. However, it is less credible that this older age group would have a similar trajectory across time as that of the treated age groups in the absence of the policy change. That is, the common trend assumption is less credible given the larger gap in age and the wellknown differences across the business cycle in rates of unemployment, job turnover, and the like with age. An attempt was made to conduct a three-period analysis of the program, with the aim of determining the outcomes of the targeted group before, during, and after the program. However, this was frustrated by the lack of a clear comparison group in the ''after'' period. Individuals treated in 1999 and 2000 would be aged 20-26 years in 2002, but that age range would consist of both treated and untreated individuals in 2000.
To test the robustness of our research design, we conduct a series of falsification exercises using data from 2002 to 2005. 12 It would be preferable to conduct a falsification exercise using a period before the program but, unfortunately, significant EI reforms in 1996-1997 render this infeasible. Table 2 compares various approaches to inference for Equation (1) using three key dependent variables, all measures of employment. The first two regressions use SLID data, and the third uses LFS data. For each dependent variable, there are two OLS specifications, one with a minimal set of covariates and the other with a full set of controls. For the data from the SLID, there is also a specification including both individual fixed effects and a full set of controls. The regression with minimal controls is, we believe, closely aligned with the central policy question, which is unconditional: What is the effect of the age-specific population-level policy change on, primarily, employment and, secondarily, other dependent variables? Regressors are subsequently added to enrich the interpretation by allowing conditional influences to be observed, and, especially, the analysis is extended to explore important gender-related heterogeneity. In all cases, but particularly for the OLS regressions, which are less time consuming to bootstrap, a large number of bootstrap replications are used to increase the precision of the estimated p-values.
Regression Analysis

Comparison Group Aged 25-30 Years
Coefficients are presented in the first line of Table 2 and, in a key result, all show sensible modest increases among the targeted group relative to the slightly older one associated with the program. Weeks of employment increased by approximately 2-2.5 weeks per year, and the probability of employment increased by 3.5 percent to 4 percent as measured in the SLID or just more than 1 percent as measured in the LFS. Turning to the alternative approaches to inference, the heteroskedasticity robust p-values in the SLID are large relative to those obtained using Stata's cluster command. Given the 16 clusters in this analysis, the degrees-of-freedom adjustment makes a modest difference, with more conservative choices having p-values close to those from bootstrapping. Two implementations of the wild cluster bootstrap t are also undertaken, the first without, and the second with, the null hypothesis that the coefficient of interest is zero imposed. The procedures use t-statistics for inference, where the bootstrap t-statistics are estimated using cluster robust standard errors. Each estimated t-statistic for the full data set is compared with an empirical distribution of t-statistics generated by the wild cluster bootstrap to produce a p-value; see Cameron et al. (2008) for details. For the OLS models, the p-values increase slightly but still mostly indicate statistical significance at conventional levels. For the fixed effect model, the p-values actually decrease slightly. In accord with the evidence in Cameron et al. (2008) and Davidson and MacKinnon (1999) , we take the wild bootstrap with the null imposed as our preferred approach to inference. It is reassuring, however, to see that there are not excessive differences in inference across the last three approaches, which are arguably superior to the others.
In fact, and very surprisingly, none of the approaches suggest dramatically different inferences. However, the clustered approaches with a large number of degrees of freedom appear to have p-values that are too small, and those for the heteroskedastic version appear to be too large if more conservative degrees of freedom adjustments are made. We observe similar patterns for the other dependent variables, although to save space we do not present these results.
In terms of the substantive results, they almost everywhere indicate statistical significance at conventional levels. In fact, the p-values for the optimal approach are quite similar for the LFS and two sets of SLID coefficients. This provides robust evidence-based on alternative approaches to inference and three variables from two data sets-that Youth Hires had a causal effect, increasing employment for the targeted age group relative to those slightly older. Nevertheless, the estimate is near the margin of what can be detected in these data.
Results from the specification in Equation (1) for a range of relevant dependent variables using 25-to 30-year-olds as a comparison group are presented in Table 3 . The upper panel presents results from the SLID, and the lower panel presents results from the LFS. Among the dependent variables from each data set, those at the top of each panel are alternative measures related to employment, unemployment, and out-of-the-labour-market status. The SLID provides two measures of each, whereas the LFS only has one. Employment is the only variable for which there is a strong prior expectation regarding the sign of the coefficient if the program is functioning as intended. Although some might also have expected unemployment to decrease, it is well known by labour economists that, especially after a recession, some of those classified as out of the labour market desire employment and are out of the labour force only because they ceased searching for a job. As jobs become available, individuals may shift from out of the labour market to employment or unemployment.
The dependent variables in the lower half of each panel represent ancillary features of the labour market that may be affected by the policy change, but we are agnostic regarding the expected sign of the coefficients because theory suggests that there might be opposing effects in operation. For example, average hours of work could increase if any additional employment results from increasing the hours of part-time workers, or they could decrease if additional low-hours part-time youths are added to the labour force. In line with impacts from changes to minimum wage legislation, the additional opportunities for employment could potentially draw youths out of school so that the percentage of full-time students might decline. These dependent variables are included to improve our understanding of the program's impacts.
The equations estimated in this table are for the relevant population first and then separately by gender. The latter highlights an interesting finding. Essentially, none of the coefficients in either data set is statistically significant for women for this comparison group aged 25-30 years (although compare with the second half of Table 4 , discussed later). The entire policy response to the Youth Hires program appears to be concentrated among men or, alternatively, the response is more muted for women and thus statistically insignificant.
Looking first at the coefficient estimates in the upper half of the table for each data set, the positive effect on employment seen in Table 2 is repeated in Table 3 . 13 Moreover, both data sets are consistent in finding that there is no statistically significant change in the unemployment rate associated with the program; rather, there is a reduction in the various measures of not in the labour force. The LFS evidence is not as compelling. Although there appears to be some reduction in those out of the labour force, the impact on employment is only statistically significant at the 11 percent level in Table 3 . This contrasts with the 9-percent level of significance for the same regression in Table 2 with more bootstraps and more precise p-values and the 6 percent level seen in Table 2 in the model without statistical controls, with the latter also having a larger point estimate. Overall, we take the evidence as suggesting that the program increased the relative employment rate of the targeted group compared with those who are slightly older, with youths simultaneously drawn into the labour force so that unemployment remained relatively stable. It also illustrates the variability of standard error estimates.
Average hours of work per worker are not statistically significantly affected by the policy change in either data set, and the estimated coefficients are of opposite signs across the data sets. Wages and annual earnings also appear to be largely unaffected, although the point estimates are mostly negative, and one of them is statistically significant. Similarly, the results are mixed for the incidence of new jobs, but there appears to be a small decrease in the LFS and also a small decrease in the incidence of full-time employment for youths. Finally, using this comparison group there is no evidence that this policy change is inducing students to leave their studies.
Comparison Group Aged 28-30 Years
Those aged 28-30 years serve as the comparison group in the regressions in Table 4 , and they are compared not only with those subsidized by the premium rebate but also with those aged 25-27 years who are slightly too old to qualify. Furthermore, those aged 18-24 years are subdivided into two smaller age groups to highlight any patterns with age. We also present the estimates separately by gender. The very first row looking at annual weeks employed in the SLID tells an interesting story. Relative to the 28-30 age group, two treated age groups for each sex (not only men as in Table 3 ) have point estimates that show appreciable relative increases in their weeks of work, with the coefficient for the youngest group being statistically significant for both men and women, whereas the coefficient for those aged 22-24 years is only statistically significant for women. In contrast, the coefficients for the age group just outside the age cut-off for the EI premium rebate are not large in magnitude (negative for men and positive for women) and are not statistically significant. For the LFS, the coefficients on employment tell the same story, but both coefficients for the policy-affected age groups are statistically significant for both genders. Again, no evidence of spillovers or displacement is observed. Although the coefficients change somewhat from Table 3 , those on labour force status variables largely support an interpretation suggesting that the policy change increased employment among the targeted age groups. In terms of the magnitude of the effects, they are appreciable, but not enormous, which accords with the magnitude of the subsidy associated with Youth Hires. They are also near the limits of detection with the small number of age groups (degrees of freedom) available. By breaking the subsidy-eligible group into an older and younger half, Table 4 also makes obvious the finding that the effects of the program appear to be larger for the 18-21 age group than the 22-24 one, which differs slightly from the informal graphical analysis. Also, some of the coefficients in the bottom half of each data set's panel that are not statistically significant in Table 3 are significant in Table 4 . In particular, there is some evidence in this specification that students were drawn out of school as a result of the subsidy to employment targeted at their age group.
Given that the coefficients for the 25-27 age group are almost never statistically significant and their signs differ between men and women, the best interpretation may be that situations in which the impact under study is close to the minimum detectable effect require great care to ensure that we are modelling the data-generating process and not the idiosyncrasies of the data. The differences between Table 3 and Table 4 highlight the need for sensitivity analysis using alternative specifications. Inference also needs to be conducted carefully. Nevertheless, we believe that the weight of evidence across these two independent data sets and various specifications supports a modest but statistically significant impact of the program with relatively little spillover.
Falsification Tests
The timing of the data for the falsification tests presented in Table 5 is not ideal, especially because there was an expansion to the EI maternity and parental leave benefits in 2001 that may have affected our age groups differentially. Nevertheless, the results provide some support for the analysis. Of the 63 regression coefficients estimated, 7 (or 11 percent) of them are statistically significant at the 10-percent level, with most of these being significant between 5 percent and 10 percent. This is well within the range of what one would expect given the level of the test. 14 More important, all of the employment-related coefficients have point estimates very close to zero, and none of them is statistically significant. Also, the significant coefficients in Table 5 do not accord with a pattern that is easy to interpret as being consistent with an alternative interpretation of the program impacts. Overall, there does not appear to be evidence to undermine the conclusions in this analysis.
Discussion and Conclusion
We examine the effectiveness of a Canadian stimulus program designed to temporarily combat high youth unemployment. The Youth Hires program subsidized employers to hire youths between ages 18 and 24 years by rebating EI premiums for net new insured employment. Overall, we believe the evidence supports the conclusion that this program served to increase weeks employed among the subsidized population by about one or two weeks per year on average, or increased employment rates by 3.5 percent to 4.4 percent, relative to older individuals. Interestingly, it appears that the effect of the program was predominantly experienced by men. The impact of female employment depends on the specification of the comparison group. In interpreting these results, it is worth remembering that the value of the annual rebate for net youth nominal earnings growth was around 3.5 percent of total insurable earnings (i.e., below $39,000 per worker per year). A substantial percentage of the total subsidy payment can be thought of as a windfall gain for employers who were expanding in any event.
A key issue relevant to our interpretation is that the business cycle pattern of the variables under study may differ across age groups, thereby confounding our findings. If this is the case, then our estimates for employment may be biased up and those for unemployment may be biased down. To alleviate this concern, we restrict our sample to very similar age groups. Also, the fact that unemployment does not appear to be affected by the policy suggests, in our view, that such biases are probably not extreme because our expectation is that both the policy and any biases would tend to decrease unemployment.
Despite fears regarding displacement, little evidence of such effects are observed in this analysis. However, if displacement effects were, say, on the order of 20 or 30 percent of the magnitude of the main effects, then it is unlikely that they would be statistically significant in these data. In some ways, our results may be similar to those found by Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) . There may be some distortion resulting from the policy, but if there is then it is small and does not overturn the intended impact of the program. Nevertheless, considering substitution and displacement is important because they are trade-offs ubiquitous in social policy development, especially when programs seek to assist targeted groups. Of course, a partial equilibrium analysis such as this cannot answer the broader general equilibrium question about the number of jobs produced in, or the benefits accruing to, the economy as a whole as a result of the program. spending multipliers are much higher during periods of high, rather than low, unemployment. 3 For a short period starting in 1997, the benefit rate was experience rated on the employee side. It decreased as the number of weeks of benefit receipt in the previous five years increased. Also, in 2013 a quasi-experience rating element was added to the system whereby claimants' job search and new job acceptance criteria were made a function of previous claim history.
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4 Given the time between announcement and implementation, concerns about anticipatory effects are warranted. As seen in Figures 1-3 , there is no evidence of anticipatory effect, especially a reduction in employment levels, at the annual level, and because the EI ''trigger'' for payments is annual, this is the relevant unit. The Online Appendix presents plots of seasonally adjusted monthly data that suggest that nothing unusual happened between February and December 1998. 5 Part time was defined as below both 15 hours per week and an earnings threshold. 6 Workers with annual earnings below a threshold, who are unable to qualify for benefits, have their share of the premiums refunded through the tax system. However, no such refunds are made to employers. 7 For more information, see Canada Employment Insurance Commission (1999, 2000, 2001 ). 8 The program entitled firms with EI premiums of up to $60,000 to a full rebate on additional hires in 1997. It is broadly similar to Youth Hires. Unfortunately, we are unable to examine the New Hires Program as a result of data limitations. 9 In discussions with stakeholders regarding Youth Hires, it was suggested that some employers were initially drawn to the rebate but then realized that the rebate was not sufficient given the productivity differences across the age groups in question. However, this is purely speculative. 10 Of particular importance when the number of clusters or observations is small, the t-statistic has the advantage of being asymptotically pivotal (i.e., its asymptotic distribution does not depend on unknown parameters), which allows for asymptotic refinement (i.e., faster convergence to the relevant test size). Also, Davidson and MacKinnon (1999) argue for imposing the null hypothesis, which can provide additional refinement if the test statistic and bootstrap data-generating process are asymptotically independent. This procedure is extended for 12 or fewer clusters in Webb (2014) and argued for in the case of unbalanced clusters in MacKinnon and Webb (forthcoming). 11 We thank Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller for making their code available. 12 This time period leaves a two-year gap after the end of the program in case there are any knock-on effects, without extending too far from the policy change given the possibility of other age-specific changes derived from the education system. See DiNardo and Lee (2011) regarding the benefits of falsification tests. 13 The coefficients in the employment regressions in Tables 2  and 3 are identical. Differences in the p-values result from Table 2 using 9,999 bootstraps whereas Table 3 uses 1,499 and is less precise. 14 Of course, it also reminds us that results in the earlier tables are subject to both type I and type II errors, although the earlier tables have, proportionately, far more coefficients that are statistically significant and typically with smaller p-values.
The data used in this article come from two sources, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID). The data sets used were constructed to maximize the number of observations for both the treatment and the comparison groups. This means that we took observations from several different panels for every year of interest. The sample was based on the reference year and the age of individuals in the reference year.
The bulk of the analysis uses observations from individuals aged 18-30 years from 1997 to 2000. The SLID surveys individuals in panels, with a panel lasting for six years, and a new panel introduced every three years. In the SLID, this means that individuals from Panel 1 are in the sample in 1997, individuals from Panel 2 are in the sample for all years, and individuals from Panel 3 are in the sample for 1999 and 2000. Although the SLID asks labour market questions of individuals aged 16 to 70 years, we restrict the sample to those who were aged 18 to 30 years at any point in a reference year.
The LFS surveys individuals in panels for six months. A new panel is introduced every month, so one-sixth of the sample is new every month. We selected all months in 1997-2000 for our sample. This involved using the tail end of some panels in the beginning of 1997 and the early part of some panels at the end of 2000. Although the LFS covers the population aged 15 years and older, we restrict the sample to those aged 18-30 years in a reference month.
Within the SLID, we used information for all jobs for the weeks employed and annual hours variables, whereas we used hours weighted averages for the annual income and average wage. Within the LFS, the total hours variable is from all jobs.
The falsification exercise presented in Table 5 
